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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALVIN G. RHODES PUMP SALES
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs/appellants,
vs.

Case No. 19163

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and THE SECOND INJURY
FUND,
Defendants/respondents.

-g
'~

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Wilbur G. Rhodes, an employee of
injured in an industrial accident on May 1,

~)

}_1' . (

5-J_,,)

appellan~ployer

1978.~\c{aim

was

was filed

with the Industrial Commission by injured employee Wilbur G. Rhodes,
against his employer Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales, and its insurance
carrier, The State Insurance Fund, for an increase in his 20% permanent
partial impairment rating previously agreed to by the Statement and
Request settlement.
~ursuant

The Second Injury Fund was also joined as a party

to Sections 35-1-68 and 69, U.C.A.

The Industrial Commission

•nt0r0d an order improperly apportioning benefits between the Second
\Jl ·;

Fund and the appe,llants.

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIO"
A hearing was held on March 25,

1982 boforP an Adr.ir,ic•c-

Law Judge to determine if the applicant's cleqree of impairment ha•I
substantially increased since the Statement and Request settler-· c·
Pursuant to that hearing,

the Administrative Law Judqe,

appointed,

medical panel to make an impartial evaluation of the medical asoec:•
(R.

114).

The medical panel report indicated that the applicant's

impairment of the lower back had not changed from the original 201
impairment rating, but that 10% of this was due to pre-existing
conditions.

The medical panel also found that the applicant had

additional 5% pre-existing impairment for alcoholism

(R.

a~

122).

Findings of the medical panel were adopted over the applic2
objections when, on August 18, 1982, the Administrative Law Judae
issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

(R.

130-1::

Motions for Review were filed by both the applicant, Wilbur G. Rhoc20
(R.
Fund

137-138), and by Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales and State Insurance
(R.

139-141).
On November 2 4, 19 82,

an Amended Order was entered by the

Industrial Commission which modified the decision of the Administra:.
Law Judge

(R.

152-153).

A Motion for Review of the Amended Order ·,:"

filed by the appellants, Alvin G.
Insurance Fund,

(R.

Rhodes Pump Sales and The State

155-156), and an Answer to Motion for Revie"· wae

filed by the respondent Second Injury Fund

(R.

157-158).

Subsec1u0c~-

a denial of a Motion for Review was entered by the Industrial
Commission on March 23,

1982

(R.

159-161).

The Petition fnr

Review was filed by plaintiffs/appellants herein on 111·r1l 22,
(R.

167-169).

\·.'1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order of this court modifying the order
of the Industrial Commission which failed to properly apportion liability
between appellants and the Second In1ury Fund as to temporary total
disability compensation and medical expenses paid by the olaintiffs to
the applicant Wilbur G. Rhodes and an order requiring the Second Injury
Fund to reimburse the appellants for an overpayment of permanent
partial disability compensation which amount was found to be preexisting the industrial accident.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal focuses entirely upon the interpretation that
the Industrial Commission gave to the medical oanel's determination
concerning the degree of Mr. Rhode's physical impairment which
resulted from the industrial accident of May 1, 1978, as opposed
to the physical impairment which was deemed pre-existing.
there appears to be no dispute as to the facts

~

Therefore,

se but there is

a serious dispute as to the apportionment of liability which was
refused by the Commission.
On or about July 23, 1980, the State Insurance Funn and the
applicant Rhodes entered into an agreement compensating the applicant
for a 2oi permanent partial impairment sustained as a result of his
industrial accident on May 1, 1978 (R. 1, 63-64).
~as

At that time there

no medical evidence available to the appellants of any pre-existing

impairment and the extent thereof.

~he

treating physician did not

hr"ak the impairment rating into increments of the pre-existing
· ntage and the percentage due to the accident.

(R. 159).

Later, Mr. Rhodes aoplied for increased benefits

_,_

(R. 3)

alleging that his condition had changed substantially.

After a

hearing before the Administrative Law Judge on March 25,

1982, tr.'.

medical aspects of the case were submittecl tn " rneclical r•anc1
appointed by the Industrial Commission.

The m0dical panc>l rr·1•rr•.

indicated that Mr. Rhodes was suffering from a 10% imoairment

•r:~

his industrial injury of May 1978 and 15% pre-existing the
industrial event, combined together for a total of 24% impairment
of the whole man

(R. 122).

These findings were adopted by the

Commission; however, no apportionment was ordered.

Subseauentl;-,

in an amended order the Administrative Law Judge found that
the applicant was entitled to additional benefits based on the
4% increase in his permanent partial impairment.

The Second

Fund was ordered to reimburse the appellants on the basis of

In1ur~·
4/24t~.

or 16.6% of amounts paid by it for temporary total disability
compensation and medical expenses.

(R.152-153).

'T'he State Ins,;ra,:·.

Fund then filed a Motion for Review for reimbursement from the Se:.
Injury Fund and apportionment of benefits as required by § 35-1-69
U.C.A.

(R.

155-156)

on the basis of 15/24 or a 62.5% reimbursement

plus a reimbursement for the overpayment of permanent partial
disability compensation.

Plaintiffs Alvin G. Rhodes PUI"\f"l Sales ans

State Insurance Fund now appeal the denial of that Motion

(R.

lsa-1;

ARGUMENT
SECTION 35-1-69 l.:.C.A. M!D CASF AUTHORITY RI:0l'IRE
THAT THF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPORTION TEt\PORARY TC1fo'
DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND 'IEDTCAL BENITITS BF:Tl!I'f'.: ~w
SECOND INJURY FUND AND '."HE Lr·\PLOYEf' A!JD THAT THI sr.~
INJURY Fmm PAY FOR THE PPJ:-EXISTIIJG IMPl1TR.MJ:::T m· "Irr
INJURED EMPLOYEE.
I.

-4-

Before explaining why the Conunission's ruling should be
reversed in this case,
1

(except as to the 4/24 described above), it

s helpful to make several introductory statements which are applicable

to the concepts involved.

First, plaintiffs do not dispute that the

applicant William G. Rhodes is entitled to his compensation; they
only raise the question of apportionment of this compensation between
the Second Injury Fund and themselves as his employer and the employer's
insurance carrier.

Second, the Second Injury Fund was created in order to
encourage employers to hire handicapped workers.

Prior to the

establishment of such a fund, an employer would be reluctant to hire
the handicapped for the obvious reason that they are a higher
risk group.

They would be more susceptible to injury and a minor

injury could result in a significantly more severe consequence such
as longer periods off work, greater medical bills, and a higher
likelihood of not being able to return to work at all.
potential liability would fall on the current employer.

All of that
With the

implementation of the Second Injury Fund concept, a disabled employee
may receive full compensation for a disability resulting from an
industrial injury as well as for his pre-existing impairments.

However,

the employer is responsible only for disability attributable to an
accidental injury occurring in that particular employment.

Northwest

Carriers v.Industrial Conunission of Utah, 639 P.2a 138, 141 (1981).
also Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 634,
I. ·1tc' '.'.
1

See

(Utah 1980);

Industrial Conunission of Utah, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1978);

erson Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 59.31.
Third, and very important to this case, is the principle

that in light of the underlying purpose of the Second Iniury
an employer should be required to pay only the amount which

run~
t~c

industrial accident added to the overall permanent impairment.
Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board v. H. & M.
P.2d 98

(Alaska 1971),

913 (Idaho 1968).

Cox v.

Loq~inq

Comoanv, 40,

Intermountain Lumber Company, 439 P.i:

See also Jacobsen Construction v. John rlonroe Ila

With these concepts in mind it now remains for us to exa"
the proper application of the present facts.

I

I

et. al., Utah Supreme Court No. 18469, June 29, 1983.

There is no dispute

the record developed before the Industrial CornJT1ission that Mr.

I

;~

R~odE'

has a permanent combined impairment of 24% of the whole man which i:
arrived at by combining the 15% due to the pre-existing conditions
and the 10% due to the industrial accident.

(R. 159).

I

The Industrii:

Commission, however, refused to limit the liability of Mr. Rhodes'
employer at the time of his industrial accident to the accident o:
May 1, 1978.

This refusal is an arbitrary failure to comply w1•h

t>,E

express provisions of the Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69, 1953,
amended in 1974.

That section mandates an aoportionment between the

employer and the Second Injury Fund.

':'his section of the act, as it

existed at the time of Mr. Rhodes' injury, orovided for the

follo~1":

apportionment of compensation:
If any employee who has previously incurred a
permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease,
or congenital causes, sustained an industrial
injury for which compensation and medical care
is provided by this title that results in permanent
incapacity, compensation and medical care, which
medical care and other related items are outlined
in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis
of the combined injuries, but the liability of tho
employer for such compensation and medical care
shall be for the industrial injury onlv and the
remainder shall be paid out of the special fund

_f,_

I

provided for in Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter
referred to as the "special fund."
A medical panel having the aualifications of the
medical panel set forth in Section 35-2-56, shall
review all medical aspects of the case and determine
first, the total permanent physical impairment
resulting from all causes and conditions including
the industrial injury; second, the percentage of
permanent physical impairment attributable to the
industrial injury; and third, the percentage of
permanent physical impairment attributable to previously
existing conditions whether due to accident injury,
disease, or congenital causes.
The Industrial Commission
shall then assess the liability for compensation and
medical care to the employer on the basis of the
percentage of the permanent physical impairment
attributable to the industrial injury only and the
remainder shall be payable out of the said special
fund.
Amou~ts, if any, which have been paid by the
employer in excess of the portion attributable to the
said industrial injury, shall be reimbursed to the
employer out of the said special funds.
Utah Code Ann.

§

35-1-69 (1953, as amended 1974)

(emohasis added)

As this Court has previously noted, the Industrial Commission
has been reluctant over the years to comply with the requirements of
this section.

See,

~·

Intermountain Smelting Coro. v. Capitano,

suora. There is no question, however, that this Court has repeatedly and
emphatically held that the apportionment provided for in Section 69
must be made in all cases involving a pre-existing disability.
See,

~

Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977):

lmite v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, Intermountain Smelting
Corp v. Capitano, supra.
But in the instant matter, only a "spirit of settlement"
persuaded the Administrative Law Judge to amend his order and
,,,,,,ire the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the plaintiffs herein
1

'"

d upon a ratio of 4,124

terr,~orciry

or 16. 6% of all amounts paid, for

total disability compensation and medical expenses.

No

reimbursement whatsoever was ordered for the permanent partial
disability compensation overpayment even thouqh

~r.

Rhoc1es' pre-

existing physical impairment and chronic alcholism were found tc
have contributed 15/24 or 62.5% of the total impairment.

The fail

of the Commission to so order is contrary to statutory mandate ar.d
all of the case authority interpreting Section 35-1-69 U.C.A.
In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Ca pi ta no, supra,

the Medi cal oa·.

found that the employee sustained a loss of bodily function of 25%
with 16.5% attributable to the pre-existing injury and 8.5% of the
result to the industrial accident.

The court reversed the C:o!'1!'1iss1c·

failure to apportion benefits and pay the applicant compensation foo
his pre-exsiting impairment emphasizing that:
compensation and medical care
. shall
be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries
but the liability of the employer. . . sh al 1 be
for the industrial injury only and the remainder
shall be paid out of the special fund provided for
J.n § 35-1-68.
Similarly, in White v. Inc1ustrial Commission of Utah,

sue:

the applicant was suffering from a 10% permanent partial iMoairment,
5% of which pre-dated the industrial in1ury and 5% of which was

industrial.

The medical panel also found that the applicant was

temporarily totally disabled for 6 months.

The Suoreme Court held

the employer responsible for 5% of the 10% perManent partial impairc
and for 50% of the temporary total disability compensation ana 50'
of the medical expenses incurred.

The Second 1n1ury Func1

WilS

mace

responsible for the remaining amounts.
In Intermountain Health Care v. Orteqa,

~·

tlie

Commission found the claimant had a permanent partial impairment o!

30%, of which 10% was attributable to a pre-existing condition.

In

apportioning liability for medical expenses between the Second Injury
f'und and the employer for partial impairment liability, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
(I)nasmuch as it appears that the pre-existing
condition increased the resulting disability by
one-third, it follows that under the requirements
of the statute, the medical expenses as well as
the compensation award should have been apportioned
two-thirds from the employer and one third from
the special fund.
562 P.2d at 619.
Likewise, 15/24 of Mr. Rhodes' permanent partial impairment
was found to have directly resulted from pre-existing conditions
aggravated by his May 1, 1978 industrial accident.
of plaintiffs on appeal that Intermountain Smelting,
and

~·

are controlling.

It is the position
elhite,

The Second Injury Fund is liable for

15/24 of Mr. Rhodes' permanent partial impairment, and 62.5% of his
medical expenses and temporary total compensation benefits.
II.
RFS JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS FROM BEING
REIMBURSED BY THE SECOND INJURY FUND FOR MR. RHODES' PRFEXISTING CONDITION.
Disallowing any reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund,
the Administrative Law Judge stated:
the State Insurance Fund .

"No reimbursements are due to

. since all questions concerning the

applicant's condition were resolved as of July 23, 1980

(R.

132).

As of July 23, 1980, no medical evidence of Mr. Rhodes' pre-existing
1

crmcrnent partial impairment was available to plaintiffs.

Therefore,

"-existing conditons were not indicated as a part of Mr. Rhodes'
11q1nal 20% permanent partial impairment by his treating physician.

The Second Injury Fund was not made a party to the settlement,
plaintiffs absorbed total liability.

Jr~

It was later 111ade a finding

of fact by the Commission that 15_/24 or 62.5\: of Mr. Rho•les' r<:r:-partial impairment was the resu 1 t of pre-exist i:1q conditions.

IR.

The Commission by its order appears to be giving res judicata effecto the benefit of the Second Injury Fund of the Statement and
settlement between Mr. Rhodes and the appellants.

Renu~'

(R. 126)

This is another in a long line of efforts by the Industrie:
Commission to find any means possible to protect the Second In1ury
Fund which it administers.

It is specious to give a nonparty to ar

agreement and a nonbenef iciary of the agreement an unintended and
unwarranted gift.

That is what the Commission is attempting.

More

importantly, if the Second Injury Fund is allowed to escape
liability here, future settlements would be discouraged and an
extremely beneficial avenue for resolving litigation quickly would
obstructed.

c'

It would result in an increased hearing case load

because there would be no benefit in attempting to resolve
compensation issues early with the injured employees.
In addition to these policy considerations, Utah law
is squarely against res judicata application here.

A similar

argument was proposed by the Second Injury Funn in Paoli v. Cotton1c
Hospital, 656 P.2d 420

(Utah 1982).

Therein, an injured e111ployee

sought recovery for a pre-existing condition attributable to an
industrial injury for which he had already been compensated unnri
laws of another state.

The Second Iniury Fund cointed out

th~t

11

potential liablity of the Fund had not been raised by either n1•
the earlier action, and the Fund had not participaten in any settle
or proceeding.

That is similar to the case at bar wherein the Potential liability
of the Second In1ury Fund was not raised by any party prior to July 8,
1982.

In the instant matter, and the Second Injury Funn did not

participate in the July 23, 1980, settlement between plaintiffs and Mr.
Rhodes.
In Paoli, the Utah Supreme Court carefully considered the
purpose of the Second Injury Fund, and concluded as follows:
(T)here may be cases where the Fund has elected not
to participate and its presence has not been
directed but where the Administrative Judge has
entered an order against the Fund.
In that event,
the Fund should be allowed to reopen the case.
in order to submit further evidence bearing on the
special interest and liability of the Fund".
That
is what the Fund should be allowed to do on the
remand on this case.
As we interpret the statutory purpose and procedure,
the Second Injury Fund llE"_ed not~e-~~ t~_\'ery
workmen's comp_en§.9t_i_Qn_N~~dinq_j;ML1n~_11l tima~ely
effect its-lnterests.
But there is a proceeau~e by
whlcn the partles--should notify the Fund as its
potential interests become apparent, and whereby the
Fund can, where necessary, compel the reopening of the
hearing
Id. at 423.
So, the Second Injury Fund wants to have the right to
reopen proceedings if it can benefit from the reopening, but if it
is something that may be detrimental to it, it does not want to
extend the same right to injured employees and employers.

Plaintiffs

on appeal ask that fairness and justice be a two way street.

A

settlement between an injured employee and his employer simply should
n·1t

preclude continuing procedings to determine the liability of the

·,nnrl Injury Fund, if any.
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata does not prevent
plaintiffs from reopening the July 23, 1980 settlement.

-11-

As this

Court stated in International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d SlS
(Utah 1979):
Concerning the doctrine of res judicata, it is
often said that both the parties and issues must
have been the same; and also that the 1udgment
is conclusive, both as to issues which were actually
tried and those which could have heen tried in the
prior action.
Id. at 516-517.
Therefore, even if the pre-existing condition and Second Injury rur'
liability issue could have been dealt with in July, 1980, the

abser~

of the Second Injury Fund and lack of uniformity between the issues
raised then and now prevent res judicata application here.

And as

indicated in Stevensen v. Bird, 636 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1981),

'1f,f:.

there are "different parties arguing over different points of law" •
"are not bound" by the earlier decision or agreement.
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED THE CONTINUING
JURISDICTION VESTED IN IT BY SECTION 35-1-78 U.C.A. IN
NOT ORDERING AN APPORTIONMENT AND REIMBURSEMENT AS REQUIRED
BY THE EVIDENCE HEREIN.
Even if the settlement agreement did have some effect on
the Second Injury Fund, Section 35-1-78 U.C.A. gives the Comrnissior.
authority to change the Second Injury Fund with its just responsibiL
by its obligation of continuing jurisdiction over the matter:
"The powers and
Commission over
and it may from
or change .

jurisdictions of the
each case shall be continuing,
time to time make such modification
as in its opinion may be justified.

It is arbitrary and capricious and manifestly unjust frr
the Commission not to have granted the relief sought in this apr>r-

In its Amended Order, the Commission did modify and
require reimbursement by the Second In-jury Fund as to 4/24 or 16.6%
of Mr. Rhodes' temporary total disability compensation and medical
cxtJenses.

Such action makes no sense if the Commission's reasoning

w0s correct.

No mention was made therein of the other 10% to 11% also

attributable to the pre-existing conditions.

This omission is wholly

without cause and is completely contrary to the result intended by
application of Section 35-1-69 to the instant findings of fact.
CONCLUSION
When Mr. Rhodes was injured in an industrial accident on
May 1, 1978, he was then suffering from pre-existing disabilities
caused by previous accidents, disease process and/or chronic
alcoholism.

Uncontroverted medical evidence and findings of fact

demonstrate that 15/24ths or 62.5% of Mr. Rhodes' disability is
attributable to those pre-existing conditions.

The Industrial

Commission's action in imposing compensation liability upon the
employer for the 20% of Mr. Rhodes' permanent partial impairment
and in refusing to properly apportion liability for temporary total
disability compensation and medical benefits and the further
unwarranted refusal to order reimbursement from the Second Injury
Fund of their share of the permanent partial disability compensation,
was arbitrary and capricious, manifestly unjust and contrary to law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ).;2_Day of July, 1983.
BLACK & MOORE

-13-
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